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Article 6

THE STATUTORY POWERS
PROCEDURE ACT, 1971*
By RONALD G. ATKEY* *
On April 17, 1972 The Statutory Powers ProcedureAct came into force.

It represents a comprehensive code of administrative procedure that will be of
immediate relevance and concern to all lawyers, civil servants and members of
the public interested in the workings of the many boards, commissions, licensing
bodies, tribunals, directors, superintendents and other public officials making
decisions under an Act of the province of Ontario.
The purpose of this article is to provide a practical introduction to the
Act and related statutes. It is not intended to provide a re-examination of the
jurisprudential underpinnings of the complex mosaic of legislation enacted
in the summer of 19711 based on the administrative law recommendations of
the McRuer Commission.2 This task has already been ably performed by
Professor John Willis 3 and Mr. Robert Reid, Q.C.4 Nor will it constitute an
exhaustive section-by-section analysis accompanied by practice notes such as
that which has been recently provided in the useful Manual of Practice prepared
by Mr. D. W. Mundell, Q.C. 5 Rather, this article is geared to the needs of the
busy practitioner or tribunal member approaching the Act for the first time and
desiring easy access to its principal features and problem areas.
Before dealing with specific sections of the Act, a word or two should be
said about its purpose. Essentially, the Act is intended to provide certainty
through a codification of the minimum rules of natural justice which are to
govern proceedings before tribunals that are authorized by statute to make
decisions deciding or prescribing rights following a hearing. In addition, the Act
specifically confers certain powers on these tribunals such as the calling of
witnesses and compelling their attendance, or the requiring of production of
documents.
• S.O. 1971, c. 47.

•* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
The Statutory PowersProcedureAct, S.O. 1971, c. 47;
The JudicialReview ProcedureAct, S.O. 1971, c. 48;
The Public InquiriesAct, S.O. 1971, c. 49;
The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1971, c. 50; and
The JudicatureAmendment Act, S.O. 1971, c. 57.
(all proclaimed in force on April 17, 1972)
2 Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (Hon. J.C. McRuer, Commissioner)
Report No. 1, Vol. 1 (1968) (hereinafter referred to as the McRuer Commission).
3 J. Willis, The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values (1968),
18 U. of T. L.J. 351.
1

4 R.F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice(Toronto: Butterworths, 1971) 461-468.

5D.W. Mundell, Manual of Practice on Administrative Law and Procedure in

Ontario(Toronto: Queen's Printer Ontario, 1972).
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To a certain extent, the Act is fashioned after the U.S. federal Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 and the model State Administrative ProcedureAct,
1961. But in true Canadian tradition it also draws on U.K. experience 6 by
setting up a Statutory Powers Procedure Rules Committee to maintain under
continuous review the existing practice and procedure of each tribunal above
the codified minimum rules of natural justice and to act as a consultative expert
body for each tribunal's rule-making activities.
A.

TO WHAT TRIBUNALS DO THE MINIMUM RULES IN THE ACT
APPLY?

This question can only be answered by satisfying each of the three
conditions contained in Section 3 (1):
Subject to subsection 2, this Part applies to proceedings by a tribunalin the exercise
of a statutory power of decision conferred by or under an Act of the Legislature,
where the tribunal is requiredby or under such Act or otherwise by law to hold or to
afford to the parties to the proceedingsan opportunityfor a hearing before making a

decision. (emphasis added)

Let us consider each of the conditions separately:
1.

There must be a "tribunal"as defined in the Act:
1 (1) (e) "Tribunal" means one or more persons, whether or not incorporated and
however described, upon which a statutory power of decision is conferred by
or under a Statute

One limitation here is that power must be "conferred by or under a
statute", which means that the tribunal must have received its power from an
thereunder, and not from the
Act of the legislature or a regulation promulgated
7
mere exercise of the Crown prerogative.
A second limitation, constitutional in nature, is that it must be an Ontario
Act or regulation conferring the power, and not a federal Act or regulation.
2.

There must be a "statutory power of decision" as defined by the Act:
1 (1) (e) "Statutory power of decision" means a power or right conferred by or under
a statute, to make a decision deciding or prescribing
(i) the legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties or liabilities of any
person or party, or
(ii) the eligibility of any person or party to receive, or to the continuation of,
a benefit or licence, whether he is legally entitled thereto or not.

Note the use of the words "deciding or prescribing". This is one of the
most significant features of the Act in that the use of both words in the context
of "rights", "privileges", "benefits", etc. means, at least at first blush, that it is
6 See The Tribunalsand InquiriesAct (1958), 6 & 7 Eliz. II, c. 66 which implemented,

in the main, the recommendations of the Franks Committee (Committee on Administrative
Tribunals and Inquiries, 1955, Sir Oliver Franks, Chairman).
7In England, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board was created in 1964 not by
statute or regulation but under prerogative Crown powers. Such a tribunal if brought into
being in Ontario in this fashion would not fall within the definition of "tribunal" under
The Statutory Powers ProcedureAct. For a decision on the rules of natural justice required
to be followed by that tribunal, see R. v. CriminalInjuries Compensation Board, ex parte

Lain, [1967] 2 Q.B. 864.
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no longer necessary to determine whether the tribunal is acting judicially or
quasi-judicially as opposed to administratively, as a condition of entitlement.
Had the above definition used only the word "deciding", then a statutory power
of decision under the Act would have been restricted to judicial or quasi-judicial
decisions. But the word "prescribing" encompasses purely administrative decisions and thus appears to remove the necessity of performing the type of verbal
gymnastics which have permeated this area of the law.
Note also the finality element which the words "to make a decision in
deciding or prescribing" convey. By implication this would seem to preclude
investigations, inquiries or advisory reports from the application of the minimum rules in the Act. This view is fortified by the specific exemption in s.3 (g) :
(g) of one or more persons required to make an investigation and to make a report,
with or without recommendations, where the report is for the information or
advice of the person to whom it is made and does not in any way legally bind or
limit that person in any. decision he may have power to make;

and the existence of a separate Public Inquiries Act s brought into force at the
same time and prescribing separate minimum rules for "inquiries" as defined
in each separate statute. Such inquiries are also specifically exempted from the
application of the minimum rules by section 2 (f).
Significantly however, this pattern in the Act of exempting investigatorytype proceedings where there is no decision is reversed for specific tribunals in
the omnibus Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act 9 which amends some
ninety-one statutes under which power is conferred on tribunals. For example,
under the amendments to The Archaeological and Historic Sites Protection
Act,' 0 before the Minister can designate any land as an archaeological or
historic site without the consent of the owner he must refer the matter to an
advisory board for a hearing and report. While the proceedings of the board are
clearly investigatory in nature since it is the Minister (in receipt of the board's
report) who makes the decision, the amendments specifically provide that
sections 6 - 16 and 21 - 23 of The StatutoryPowers ProcedureAct, 1971 apply
mutatis mutandis with respect to the hearing before the board. In effect, this
brings into operation all the minimum rules except the right to a written decision
with reasons if requested (section 17), notice of decision (section 18), and a
record of the proceedings (section 20), all of which are of little consequence
anyway because it is the Minister who makes the decision in the manner
prescribed by statute. Thus the prudent lawyer, before writing off the minimum
rules as inapplicable to investigatory-type proceedings will want to carefully
check the individual statute authorizing the investigation to see if all or some of
the minimum rules have not been incorporated by cross-reference to The
StatutoryPowersProcedureAct.
3. There must be a statutory or common law requirement to hold or afford
to the parties an opportunity for a hearing before making a decision:
8 S.O. 1971 c. 49.

9S.O. 1971 c. 50.
10 S.O. 1971, c. 50, S. 8(2), substituting a new section 2 of The Archaeological and
HistoricSites ProtectionAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 26.
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In most cases, this will be clearly spelled out in the statute creating and
conferring power on the tribunal. Indeed, it is the stated intention of the government that future statutes should expressly specify whether a hearing is required
and that all existing statutes should be so amended if it is considered that the
hearing requirement is appropriate. 1 But the phrase "required... or otherwise
by law" (applied to a hearing) preserves the implied common law requirement
for a hearing, thus giving rise to some uncertainty. It depends in large part
whether a reviewing court (in most cases, the Divisional Court) will imply the
hearing requirement from analagous words in the statute12 or from the application of the maxim audi alteram partem in cases where the tribunal is thought to
have a duty to act judicially or quasi-judicially.' 3 What this means then, is that
when the statute is silent as to a hearing, one is thrust back into the long line of
cases which attempt to determine whether a tribunal is acting judicially or quasijudicially and thereby required to hold a hearing. This highly acrobatic 14 area
of the law is supposedly one which the draftsman of the Act sought to avoid by
inclusion of the words "deciding or prescribing" in the definition of "statutory
power of decision". Yet the troublesome legacy may be preserved by section
3 (1) allowing the hearing condition to be required "or otherwise by law", thus
continuing the relevance of the voluminous case law where the courts have
implied a hearing.15
However, while certainty may be a desirable objective in terms of knowing
exactly to what tribunals the minimum rules are to apply, the residual protection
afforded by virtue of a reviewing court being able to say that a hearing is
required "otherwise by law" is valuable in permitting the courts to supply
legislative omissions in cases where individual rights might otherwise be subject
to procedural injustices. In other words the courts will have ample scope to
supplement the list of tribunals which the legislature has decided should be
subject to the minimum rules in the Act.
B.

WHAT TRIBUNALS ARE SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED FROM
THE MINIMUM RULES?
Exemptions are obtained in three ways:

1. The proceedings of some tribunals are specifically exempted in section
3 (2) of the Act:
3 (2) This Part does not apply to proceedings,
(a) before the Assembly or any committee of the Assembly;
11 See Mundell, op. cit.supra, note 5, at 4 - 5.
12 See Border CitiesPress Club v. A.G. Ontario,[1954] O.W.N. 663 (reversed on other

grounds, [1955] O.R. 14) where the words "on sufficient cause being shown" were inter-

preted as shown by means of an oral hearing." Also, see Cresswell v. Etobicoke-Mimico
ConservationAuthority, [1951] O.R. 197 where the words "consider and determine" were

held to imply a hearing. See, generally, Reid, supranote 4, at 15 - 19.
13 Boardof Educationv. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179. See Reid, id. at 21 - 27,33 - 38.
14
Borrowed from John Willis in (1940), 53 Harv. L. Rev. 251 at 281.
15 Both Reid, supra, note 4 at 1 - 52, and deSmith, JudicialReview of Administrative
Action (London: Stevens 2d ed. 1968) 135 - 229 exhaustively cover the judicialadministrative distinction as related to the right to a hearing.
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(b) in or before,
(i) the Supreme Court,
Q'i) a county or district court,
(iii) a surrogate court,
(iv) a provincial court established under The ProvincialCourtsAct
(c) to which the rules of practice and procedure of the Supreme Court apply;
(d) before an arbitrator to which The Arbitrations Act or The Labour Relations Act applies;
(e) at a coroner's inquest;
(f) of a commission appointed under The PublicInquiriesAct, 1971;
(g) of one or more persons required to make an investigation and to make a
report, with or without recommendations, where the report is for the
information or advice of the person to whom it is made and does not in
any way legally bind or limit that person in any decision he may have
power to make;
(h) of a tribunal empowered to make regulations, rules or by-laws in so far as
its power to make regulations, rules or by-laws is concerned.

2. The proceedings of other tribunals may be exempted for a maximum
period of one year dating from April 17, 1972, by order of the LieutenantGovernor in Council under section 36 (1). Tribunals established and operating
under the following statutes have been given one year exemptions:
The Air Pollution Control Act (now superceded by The Environmental
ProtectionAct)
The Athletics ControlAct
The Blind Workmen's CompensationAct
The Farm ProductsMarketing Act
The FireMarshalls'Act
The HospitalServices CommissionAct
The LabourRelations Act
The Liquor ControlAct
The Liquor Licence Act
The Milk Act
The OntarioEnergy Board Act
The OntarioMunicipalBoard Act
The Ontario Water Resources Act
The Police Act
The Power Commission Act
The SecuritiesAct
The Workmen's CompensationAct 16
Since there may well be further one-year exemption orders, a party or his
lawyer should check the most recent Orders in Council before claiming the
protections of the Act prior to April 17, 1973. A more limited Order in
Council 17 exempting the "public hearing" requirement (section 9) for a maximum of one year has been made in respect of all tribunals exercising licensing
and disciplinary powers over the self-governing professions.
It would appear that section 36(1) of the Act was inserted to provide a
maximum one-year reprieve for a large number of important tribunals which
16
17

O/Reg. 162/72.
O/Reg. 163/72.
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are not yet in a position to operate effectively under the wholesale application
of the minimum rules. But since the transitional period is limited to a maximum
of one year, the onus is on the tribunals to either revise their procedures to
comply within a reasonable period or to seek legislative sanction for a modification of the minimum rules as applied to their particular proceedings. This
illustrates graphically the pervasive nature of the Act as a comprehensive code
of minimum procedural rules, departures from which are permitted only through
special legislative treatment.
3. The proceedings of some tribunals may be exempted from The Statutory
PowersProcedureAct by specific provisions in other legislation. For example,
a recent amendment to The Department of CorrectionalServices Act contained
in The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act provides:
34. The Statutory Powers ProcedureAct, 1971 does not apply to proceedings for the

discipline of inmates in correctional institutions or to their transfer under section
10 or for the authorization under section 18 or 19 of temporary absences of
inmates or to proceedings of the Board notwithstanding anything in that Act.

However, before such exemption can be effective, express words sufficient to
satisfy the "notwithstanding" injunction of Section 32 of The StatutoryPowers
Procedure Act must be included in the other statute, otherwise the minimum
rules prevail. Section 32 reads:
32. Unless it is expressly provided in any other Act that its provisions and regulations, rules or by-laws made under it apply notwithstanding anything in this Act,
the provisions of this Act and of rules made under section 33 prevail over the
provisions of such other Act and over regulations, rules or by-laws made under
such other Act which conflict therewith.

C.

ASSUMING THE MINIMUM RULES DO APPLY, HOW CAN THEY
BE MODIFIED OR AVOIDED?

While the Act was intended to provide a comprehensive code of minimum
rules and procedure for all tribunals deciding or prescribing rights following a
hearing, there are a variety of situations in which, as a practical matter, it would
be neither in the interests of the parties nor of the tribunal to have all the rules
applied in their full force and effect. Flexibility is provided in the following
provisions:
1. Section 4 provides that the parties may waive a hearing or compliance
with any other requirement of the Act so that a tribunal can proceed to dispose
of the matter by mere agreement, consent or decision without the fear of a
subsequent challenge based on failure to observe procedural niceties. However,
this is conditional on obtaining positive agreement from all parties. If one of
the parties does not show up at a hearing in response to proper notice, then
this may not be treated as an implied agreement to a consent order or decision
and the tribunal is not absolved of the responsibility of compliance with the Act
except that it is not required under section 7 to provide any further notice in the
proceedings to the absent party. This means that the tribunal must still comply
18 S.O. 1971, c. 50, s. 27, adding new section 34 to The Department of Correctional
Services Act.
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with such rules as the public hearing requirement (section 9), the requirement
of giving a written decision with reasons if requested (section 7), and the
requirements respecting a record of the proceedings (section 20). While this
might appear to be unduly cumbersome to some tribunals, it is a further
protection for the party who does not realize the serious implications of nonattendance at a hearing until he receives the tribunal's adverse decision. For not
only are his appeal rights preserved but it would seem that his right to make an
application for judicial review to force compliance with all the minimum rules
apart from notice requirements would still be open.
2. Concurrent with the enactment and coming into force of The Statutory
Powers Procedure Act was The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act 19
amending some 91 statutes under which power is conferred on tribunals. The
purpose of these amendments was, inter alia, to clarify for each tribunal the
nature and scope of its power, by whom it is to be exercised, whether and under
what circumstances a hearing is required, who are the "parties" to a hearing,
and the nature of the appeal rights from the decisions of each tribunal. But The
Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act in certain cases also provides for
particular modifications of the minimum rules of procedure in The Statutory
PowersProcedure Act.
One example of such a modification can be found in the amendments to
The Family Benefits Act respecting procedure before the Board of Review:
12 (3) Notwithstanding The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 1971, all hearings of
the board of review shall be heard in camera. 20

This is a modification of section 9 of the minimum rules relating to public
hearings. Likewise, modifications of the section 6 notice requirement of the
minimum rues are expressly provided by amendments to The Mining Act for
certain proceedings before the Mining Commissioner. 21 However, for a modification of the minimum rules to be effective, it must expressly stipulate that the
section applies "notwithstanding The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 1971"
to overcome the paramountcy of the minimum rules expressed in section 32 of
that Act.
3. A third way in which the rigours of the minimum rules can be avoided is
through a claim that a breach of one of the rules is merely a defect in form or a
technical irregularity. This is essentially a built-in protection of flexibility for
the tribunals, as opposed to the parties appearing before them, and it is contained in section 3 of The JudicialReview ProcedureAct.22 This Act is the new
procedural vehicle for obtaining judicial review as an alternative to the prerogative writs, and its procedure is open to any of the parties before a tribunal on a
breach of one or more of the minimum rules. Section 3 of The JudicialReview
ProcedureAct provides:
On an application for judicial review in relation to a statutory power of decision,
where the sole ground for relief established is a defect in form or a technical
19 S.O. 1971, c. 50.
20 S.O. 1971, c. 50, s. 38(7).
21 S.O. 1971, c. 50, s. 58 (13), substituting new sections 146 - 148 of The Mining Act.
22 S.O. 1971, c. 48, s. 3.
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irregularity, if the court finds that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has
occurred, the court may refuse relief and, where the decision has already been made,
may make an order validating the decision, notwithstanding such defect, to have
effect from such time and on such terms as the court considers proper.

The effect of this provision is to vest a broad judicial discretion in the Divisional
Court to dismiss an application for judicial review even where a breach of the
minimum rules in The Statutory Powers ProcedureAct has been proved,
if no
real injustice has occurred. This section goes a long way to meet the criticism of
Professor John Willis that mandatory codes of minimum rules of procedure
before tribunals merely give a zealous lawyer a second string to his bow to make
frivolous procedural objections in court after he has lost on the merits.
D. WHO ARE THE PARTIES WHO CAN CLAIM RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER THE ACT?
The Act itself provides virtually no assistance in answering this question.
Section 5 states merely that:
The parties to any proceedings shall be the persons specified as parties by or under
the statute under which the proceedings arise or, if not so specified, persons entitled
by law to be parties to the proceedings.

It may be a laudable objective for the parties to be specified in the particular statute or regulation under which proceedings arise. At first blush this
would appear to overcome the difficulty of applying the common law rules of
"standing" in attempting to clearly determine who can take part in the hearing.
However, upon closely examining the statutes which have been amended by
The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act to see how specific the general
provisions are on this point, one soon realizes that many such provisions are
little more than a delegation of the discretion back to the tribunal to determine
in its wisdom who should be the parties to its proceedings. The following
amendment to The Ontario Highway TransportBoard Act is typical:
17a(2) Where the Board holds a rehearing under section 17, the parties to the
proceedings relating to that rehearing are the persons who were parties to the
initial hearing and such other persons as the Boardmay specify. 4

By vesting such a discretion back in the tribunal, such legislation tends to
provide an indirect statutory waiver of the common law rules of "standing" and
gives the Board the ultimate discretion as to who can appear before it. It might
have been better if section 5 had attempted merely to codify the common law
rules by using language such as "any person who will be directly affected by the
decision of the tribunal is entitled to be a party", and thereby not openly invite
a specific statutory delegation back to the tribunal of the power to unilaterally
determine who can be parties.
The question of who may be a party is an important one in hearings before
such tribunals as the Ontario Municipal Board where there are often large
numbers of citizens' and ratepayers' groups demanding "party" status and the
procedural rights which come with it. One technique which a tribunal might be
23 Willis, supranote 3, at 359.

24S.O. 1971, c. 50, s. 62(4).
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expected to adopt in cases where it is not known in advance who Will be claiming
party status is to advertise and hold a preliminary hearing at which all persons
claiming to be "parties" would be requested to come forward to make submissions to the tribunal as to why they should be entitled to this status. Once such
a preliminary hearing had been advertised and held, then it would seem unlikely
that a person not appearing could subsequently claim "party status" provided
of course that the holding of the preliminary hearing was properly and sufficiently advertised in the community to be affected by the tribunal's eventual
decision.
E.

WHAT ARE THE MAIN RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER
THE MINIMUM RULES?

The following is a summary list of the main rights and protections which
can be claimed by a party:
1. The right to reasonable notice of the hearing (section 6).
2. The right to reasonable information of any allegations respecting his good
character, propriety of conduct or competence if such matters are in issue
(section 8).
3. The right to a public hearing unless public security or intimate financial or
personal matters are involved (section 9).
4. The right to be represented by a lawyer or an agent (section 10(a)).
5. The right to call and examine witnesses, and to cross-examine other
witnesses (section 10(b) (c)).
6. The right to protection against self-incrimination respecting the use of
evidence in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings (as far as the Province
can grant that right) (section 14).
7. The right to reasonable adjournments of a hearing (section 21).
8. The right to a written decision, with reasons upon request (section 17).
In addition to the above eight rights and protections accorded to a party to
the hearing, the Act makes the protection against self-incrimination (section 14)
available to witnesses. Also, section 11 makes provision for the right of a witness
to be advised by his counsel or agent when he is giving evidence.
While many of the above rights and protections are set forth in reasonably
straightforward fashion, there are some which should be looked at in detail
since they present problems or pose ambiguities.
(a) Right to reasonablenotice of the hearing
The right to reasonable notice of a hearing is spelled out in section 6 as
follows:
(1) The parties to any proceedings shall be given reasonable notice of the hearing by
the tribunal
(2) A notice of a hearing shall include,
(a) a statement of the time, place and purpose of the hearing;
(b) a reference to the statutory authority under which the hearing will be held;

and
(c) a statement that if the party notified does not attend at the hearing, the
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tribunal may proceed in his absence and he will not be entitled to any further
notice in the proceedings.

Bill 130, an earlier version of The Statutory Powers ProcedureAct which
was allowed to die on the order paper at the 1968-69 session of the Legislature,
contained a more detailed section relating to notice requirements. In particular,
it required "a concise statement of the issues" and "a reference to the rules of
procedure applicable to the hearing", and at least to that extent provided a
higher standard of right. There is considerable difference between providing
"a concise statement of the issues" and "a statement of the... purpose of the
hearing" as in present section 6(2) (a), yet no reasons are apparent for the
watering down of the contents of the notice and thereby reducing the quality of
the protection. However section 8 of the present Act does contain an additional
protection requiring the tribunal under certain circumstances to furnish more
detailed information in its possession prior to the hearing.
8. Where the good character, propriety of conduct or competence of a party is an
issue in any proceedings, the party is entitled to be furnished prior to the hearing
with reasonable information of any allegations with respect thereto.

Similarly, the removal of the earlier requirement that the notice contain "a
reference to the rules of procedure applicable to the hearing" tends to water
down the nature of the "notice" protection somewhat, particularly where a
party does not have available the services of counsel or an informed agent to
advise him of the particular tribunal's hearing procedures which ard usually
"buried" in recent statutory amendments or regulations.
There is a unique feature in the Act relating to the notice requirement in
situations where the parties are so numerous that it would be impracticable to
give the usual type of notice:
24. (1) Where a tribunal is of opinion that because the parties to any proceedings
before it are so numerous or for any other reason, it is impracticable,
(a) to give notice of the hearing; or
(b) to send its decision and the material mentioned in section 18,
to all or any of the parties individually, the tribunal may, instead of doing so,
cause reasonable notice of the hearing or of its decision to be given to such
parties by public advertisement or otherwise as the tribunal may direct.

This section sets up an unnecessarily wide loophole in the use of this
alternative notice procedure by the words "for any other reason". Also, while
the device of "public advertisement" is a reasonable alternative provided that
the content requirements of section 6 are met in the public advertisement, yet
another loophole is created by allowing reasonable notice to be given "otherwise as the tribunal may direct". Indeed, the two loopholes in this section may
well constitute direct statutory authority permitting a tribunal to effectively
vitiate the specific notice requirements of section 6.
(b) Right to a public hearing
Another procedural right requiring closer scrutiny here is the public
hearing requirement in section 9 (1), as follows:
9 (1) A hearing shall be open to the public except where the tribunal is of the opinion

that,
(a) matters involving public security may be disclosed; or
(b) intimate financial or personal matters or other matters may be disclosed at
the hearing of such a nature, having regard to the circumstances, that the
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desirability of avoiding disclosure thereof in the interest of any person
affected or in the public interest outweighs the desirability of adhering to
the principle that hearings be open to the public,
in which case the tribunal may hold the hearing concerning any such matters
in camera.

While "matters involving public security" or "intimate financial or personal
matters" are capable of reasonably precise definition, the inclusion of the words
"or other matters" would appear to open up the exception to an unnecessarily
wide degree by vesting in the tribunal a discretion virtually unfettered except for
the balancing test requirement. Also, it is curious why the draftsman of section
9 (1) did not see fit to subject the "public security" exception to the balancing
test as he did in respect of "intimate financial or personal matters or other
matters". It may be that he was attempting to broaden the discretion of the
tribunal in the case of the latter so that it could not always opt for a closed
hearing where intimate financial or personal matters were involved, while the
right to a closed hearing for public security matters might be more certain.
In any event, it should be remembered that some of the amendments
contained in The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act expressly enact a
provision authorizing hearings to be held in camera notwithstanding anything in
The Statutory Powers ProcedureAct, thereby overriding section 9 (1). This is
the likely pattern to be developed with respect to hearing by self-governing
professional bodies concerning a member's professional capacity or reputation.
(c) Right to counsel
Another procedural protection requiring a closer look is the right to be
represented at a hearing by counsel or an agent, as provided by section 10(a).
The inclusion of an agent in this protection is encouraging particularly in view
of the diverse expertise required before the numerous tribunals in Ontario and
the emergence of para-legal personnel who are not qualified to practice law in
the Province but are nonetheless competent to properly represent or advise
parties before certain tribunals. However, it does seem unfortunate that section
23(3) of the Act discriminates between a barrister and solicitor qualified to
practice in Ontario and a person appearing as agent on behalf of a party or as an
adviser to a witness when it comes to excluding the latter and not the former
from a hearing if "such person is not competent properly to represent or to
advise the party or witness or does not understand and comply at the hearing
with the duties and responsibilities of an advocate or adviser". It may be that a
tribunal needs this sort of protection to prevent abuse of its processes, particularly in cases where a hearing is being used as a platform for extraneous political
purposes. However, there is no absolute guarantee that an Ontario barrister
ad solicitor could not be capable of the same potential abuses, -ad if the
tribunal feels it needs protection it should have it against incompetent or irresponsible lawyers as well. While it is admitted that the discipline of the legal
profession generally is the primary responsibility of the Law Society of Upper
Canada, the purpose of section 23(3) is to give to a tribunal the power to
prevent abuse of its own proceedings. There is no reason or justification for
exempting the legal profession from being subject to that power.
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(d) Right to cross-examination
The right to cross-examination of witnesses at a hearing in section 10(c)
seems straightforward at first glance. However, on a closer reading there is a
rather substantial restriction on the right, and a further problem created by
specific statutory provisions permitting certain key government officials not to
attend a hearing but to submit their evidence in writing. Section 10(c) provides
that a party may conduct cross-examination of witnesses "reasonably required
for a full and fair disclosure of the facts in relation to which they have given
evidence". This sets up in effect a "relevance" test which is a higher standard
than that which applies in the courts. The sanction to enforce this limitation is
contained in section 23 (2):
A tribunal may reasonably limit further cross-examination of a witness where it is
satisfied that the cross-examination of the witness has been sufficient to disclose fully
and fairly the facts in relation to which he has given evidence.
This sanction will likely be used where there are hearings with many parties
involved, each with counsel or an agent.
A major problem related to cross-examination arises in the case of specific
statutes where a key witness, generally a government official, is specifically
authorized to submit his evidence in writing and thereby avoid being summonsed
to the hearing and subjected to cross-examination. Consider the following
section relating to submissions of the Director of Family Benefits at a Board of
Review hearing under recent amendments to The Family Benefits Act contained
in The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act 25
(6) The Director may make his submissions at a hearing of the board or review in
writing, but the applicant or recipient who is a party to the hearing shall be

afforded an opportunity to examine before the hearing any such submission or

any written or documentary evidence that the Director proposes will-be produced
or any report the contents of which the Director proposes will be given in
evidence at the hearing.

This section may be construed as meaning that the Director is not required
to attend the hearing. While his written statement must be provided to the
parties for examination in advance of the hearing, it is unlikely that the Board
of Review would issue a summons to the Director in view of the specific statutory direction allowing him to make his submissions in writing. Therefore, even
though an applicant at the Board hearing may be faced with the damaging
statements submitted by the Director, he is effectively prevented from challenging them through the usual device of cross-examination and his only protection
is to lead his own evidence to contradict the written statements submitted.
F.

WHAT NEW POWERS ARE CONFERRED ON TRIBUNALS BY
THE ACT?

The new Act is best known for the fact that tribunals deciding or prescribing rights following a hearing are now required to observe certain minimum rules
of procedure. However, a second purpose was to confer certain new or clarified
powers on such tribunals to enable them to adequately discharge their adjudi25S.O. 1971, c. 50,s. 38(7), amending s. 1 la of The Family Benefits Act.
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cative responsibilities. Prior to the Act, such powers of tribunals varied with
each statute. Sometimes very broad powers were conferred by statutory phrases
such as "the powers of a civil court" and these would include the power to issue
bench warrants for the arrest and detention of witnesses and the power to direct
imprisonment of persons for contempt. Occasionally these powers were conferred on a tribunal consisting of one person without previous experience in the
exercise of such powers. In other situations, a tribunal would find its authorized
powers too limited and would be unable to summons a witness or order the
production of documents when requested by a party notwithstanding that the
information was essential to the disposition of the case before it.
What the present Act does is to standardize the powers that are conferred
on tribunals and to provide judicial controls to limit possible arbitrary action.
The following is a brief review of the four main powers conferred on tribunals
by the Act.
1.

Summonses to witnesses andproductionof documents

Section 12 grants to a tribunal the power to require any person, including
a party, by summons to give evidence or produce documents. The specific form
of the summons is included in the statute and must be signed by the Chairman of
the tribunal. The two main limitations of the power are that the evidence and
documents sought must be "relevant to the subject matter of the proceedings
and admissible at a hearing". The person receiving the summons is entitled to be
served personally and to receive like fees and allowances as he would if he had
been summonsed to attend before the Supreme Court.
The sanction for non-compliance with a summons is achieved through
application to a judge of the Supreme Court for a bench warrant upon proof of
non-attendance, the payment of requisite fees and that the presence of the
person summonsed is "material to the ends of justice".
An alternative and supplementary sanction is through contempt proceedings brought by means of a stated case to the Divisional Court under section 13
of the Act.
2.

Evidence

Section 15 is one of the most notable features of the new Act. It recognizes
that tribunals must take a more open approach towards the scope of evidence
that can be admitted at a hearing, and that the rules of evidence as applied in
the courts are perhaps too restrictive for the administrative process. The section
takes a "wide open" approach by providing that any oral testimony or document
or other thing is admissible whether under oath or admissible in a court, subject
only to four limitations:
(a) it must be relevant to the subject matter of the proceedings;
(b) it must not be unduly repetitious;
(c) it cannot be inadmissible in a court by reason of any privilege under the
law of evidence;
(d) it cannot be inadmissible by the statute under which the proceedings arise
or any other statute.
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Therefore, providing the general intent of the section is not undermined by
express evidentiary limitations in other statutes, section 15 sanctions a general
departure from the strict common law and statutory rules. This will permit
tribunals to conduct their proceedings more informally and expeditiously since
they will not be hampered by evidentiary objections such as those usually based
on the exclusionary hearsay rules of evidence.
3.

Judicialnotice

As with the evidence provisions, a tribunal under section 16 has wider
powers respecting judicial notice than a court:
16. A tribunal may, in making its decision in any proceedings,
(a) take notice of facts that may be judicially noticed; and
(b) take notice of any generally recognised scientific or technical facts, information or opinions within its scientific or specialized knowledge.

The expended power in sub-section (b) may put a party at an unfair
disadvantage however, particularly if "notice of any generally-recognized scientific or technical facts, etc." is taken after the conclusion of a hearing but before
the rendering of a decision. A party may thereby be deprived of the right to
challenge the validity of the facts, information or opinions "noticed". The
McRuer Commission, along with a recommendation that a tribunal's power of
judicial notice be extended as above, recommended that "parties should be
notified either before or during the hearing, of matters officially noticed in order
that they might contest them". 26 This latter recommendation was carried
forward into Bill 130, the earlier version of The Statutory Powers Procedure
Act, but was dropped from the present Act.
While it might be unduly onerous to expect a tribunal to reveal in advance
the exact details of all its expert facts, information or opinions, it would seem
reasonable for it to be required to reveal a summary of such matters, particularly
where they will eventually form an important part of the tribunal's decision. A
reviewing Court should be able to sort out whether such a summary was fair and
equitable as notice to the parties in order to give them an opportunity to
challenge the Board's facts, information or opinions.
Mr. Mundell in his Manual of Practice 27 states that:
Where a tribunal proposes to take notice of facts, information or opinions under
clause B without taking evidence on them, the sound practice for the tribunal to
follow is to inform any parties at the hearing of such matters, if they are not already
aware of them, and to give them an opportunity to contest them before the tribunal
makes its decision. (emphasis added)

It is curious that what is regarded as "sound practice" was not translated
into legislation, as suggested above.
4.

Administration of oaths
Prior to this Act, there was some doubt as to whether a member of a
tribunal in the absence of statutory sanction had the right to administer an oath
26

McRuer Commission, supranote 2, at 217.
27 Mundell, supra, note 5 at 21.
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or affirmation. This is now clarified by section 22 which specifically confers this
power as follows:
22. A member of a tribunal has power to administer oaths and affirmations for the
purpose of any of its proceedings and the tribunal may require evidence before
it to be given under oath or affirmation.

The effect of this section coupled with the permissive words of section 15
allowing a tribunal to admit any oral testimony or document whether or not
given or proven under oath or affirmation, is that the tribunal has a discretion
as to whether to require evidence to be proven under oath or affirmation or not
to be so proven.
G.

WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES IF A TRIBUNAL FAILS TO
OBSERVE ONE OF THE MINIMUM RULES?

The Act is silent on this question. However, one may look to The Judicial
Review ProcedureAct under which an aggrieved person may make an application for judicial review to prevent or set aside the tribunal's decision based on
the exercise of any power to which the rules apply if there is a failure to follow
them. This is not much different in substance from the old-style application for
an order in the nature of prohibition and certiorari in Weekly Court when a
tribunal in the purported exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers failed to
observe the common law rules of natural justice. The only differences under the
new procedure will be that the application normally28 will be to the three-man
Divisional Court29 rather than a single High Court judge sitting in Weekly
Court, and what will be proved is a breach of a statutory rule rather than an
implied common law rule. A third difference, assuming that the tribunal is one
obliged by statute to hold a hearing before making its decision, is that it is no
longer necessary to establish that the tribunal was acting judicially or quasijudicially as opposed to administratively, because of the broad definition of
"statutory power of decision" discussed in Section A above.3 0
Where there is a statutory right of appeal from a tribunal's decision, then
it may not be necessary to proceed under The JudicialReview Procedure Act
since the failure to observe one of the minimum rules may itself be a ground of
appeal. This assumes, of course, that the party complaining of the nonobservance of a rule is willing to wait for the tribunars decision before seeking
28

Section 6(2) of The Judicial Review Procedure Act keeps open the right to make
application for judicial review to a single High Court judge, but such application may be
made only with leave and relief granted only "where it is made to appear to the judge that
the case is one of urgency and that the delay required for an application to the Divisional
Court is likely to involve a failure of justice"
29 Proceedings before the Divisional Court involve the Chief Justice of the High Court
(or his designee) presiding, and two other judges of the High Court. There may be two more
sections of the Divisional Court, as directed by the Chief Justice of the High Court from
time to time. See The JudicatureAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, ss. 6 and 48.
3
o However, if the statute conferring power on the tribunal does not expressly require
a hearing before a decision is made, the judicial and administrative distinction then
becomes relevant in determining whether the obligation to hold a hearing may be implied,
i.e. "required... otherwise by law." See the discussion in Section A.
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relief. The following section of The Day Nurseries Act 3l provides a right
of appeal from a decision or order of the Day Nursery Review Board to
the Divisional Court, and the language used is typical of appeal provisions
respecting a number of tribunals covered in The Civil Rights Statute Law
Amendment Act:
13. (1) Any party to the proceedings before the Board may appeal from its decision
or order to the Supreme Court in accordance with the rules of court.
(2) Where notice of an appeal is served under this section, the Board shall forthwith file with the Registrar of the Supreme Court the record of the proceedings
before it in which the decision or order appealed from was made, which, together
with the transcript of evidence before the Board if it is not part of the Board's
record, shall constitute the record in the appeal.
(3) The Minister is entitled to be heard, by counsel or otherwise, on the argument
of an appeal under this section.
(4) The Supreme Court may affirm the decision of the Board appealed from or
may rescind it and make such new decision as the court considers proper and, for
such purpose, the court may exercise all the powers of the Board after a hearing
before it and may substitute its opinion for that of the Board.

The above provisions provide for an appeal on all questions whether of
law or fact or both, and the Divisional Court is given full power to overrule the
Board in virtually every respect including substituting its own opinion for that
of the Board.
Some of the provisions providing appeals from other tribunals (contained
in The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act) provide for a more restricted
appeal, e.g. one limited to "any question that is not a question of fact alone."
Even though this more restricted language is used, it is clear that a failure to
observe one of the minimum rules would be within the scope of such an appeal
since as a statutory breach it would involve a question of law.
If a party during the tribunal's proceedings but prior to the decision wishes
to raise a procedural objection (e.g., the failure to comply with the notice
provisions of section 6), then an application for judicial review would be the
only appropriate remedy. But in many situations a party will prefer to await
the outcome of the hearing on its merits since the procedural defect may be
rendered moot by a decision in his favour. Under these circumstances the
prudent lawyer on behalf of the party will raise the procedural objection as
soon as it becomes apparent during the hearing, and see that it is duly noted as
part of the record (particularly if there is no transcript of the oral evidence
being taken) so that his client will not later be prejudiced by laches or estoppel
from bringing an application for judicial review or statutory appeal should he be
unsuccessful on the merits.
Faced with a choice of an application for judicial review or a statutory
appeal in pursuing a breach of one of the minimum rules, most lawyers will
prefer the statutory appeal route because of the wider powers available to the
Divisional Court on an appeal as compared with a review. For not only will the
appeal route allow a party to combine an appeal on the merits with the procedural defect, but section 5 of The Statutory PowersProcedureAct provides that
31 S.O. 1971, c. 50, s. 25(2) substituting new sections 5 - 14 of The Day NurseriesAct.
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an appeal, but not a review, will stay proceedings before the tribunal thus
precluding implementation or enforcement of the tribunal's decision until the
appeal is disposed of. Section 25 reads:
25. (1)Unless it is expressly provided to the contrary in the Act under which the
proceedings arise, an appeal from a decision of a tribunal to a court or other
appellate tribunal operates as a stay in the matter except where the tribunal or
the court or other body to which the appeal is taken otherwise orders.
(2) An application for judicial review under The JudicialReview ProcedureAct,
1971, or the bringing of proceedings specified in subsection 1 of section 2 of that
Act is not an appeal within the meaning of subsection 1.

Notice that the appeal will not operate as a stay if express words to the contrary
are provided in the Act under which the proceedings arise, or if the Appellate
Court otherwise orders. Conversely, while an application for judicial review
does not stay proceedings, section 4 of The Judicial Review Procedure Act
provides that the court "can make such interim order as it considers proper
pending the final determination of the application." This power would include
an interim order to stay proceedings if considered proper.
One problem that arises in combining a breach of the minimum rules with
an appeal on the merits in a single statutory appeal is whether the procedural
defect, if proven, renders the tribunal's decision void or merely voidable. If it is
void, the Court has no choice but to declare the decision a nullity and the parties
must start proceedings before the tribunal over again, with no decision forthcoming from the Court on the merits of the appeal. If the tribunal's decision is
merely voidable, then the Court can still adjudicate on the merits notwithstanding the procedural defect, and the parties can thus be spared the necessity of
going back before the tribunal for a new hearing and awaiting a second appeal
to determine the merits.
This is a problem on which the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal
may well have to rule in the near future. There is some support to be found for
the "voidable" alternative in section 2(5) and 3 of The JudicialReview Procedure Act in respect of applications for judicial review. Section 2(5) preserves
the reviewing Court's common law discretion3 2 to refuse to grant any relief on
such applications. Section 3 permits the Court to refuse relief where the sole
ground is a defect in form or a technical irregularity and no substantial wrong
or miscarriage of justice has occurred. While none of the provisions providing
for statutory rights of appeal in The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act
make reference to these sections of The Judicial Review Procedure Act in
respect of breaches of the minimum rules which are raised as part of the statutory appeal, one would hope they could be read into the court's powers on such
appeals thus sanctioning the "voidable" approach. To do otherwise would be
to promote a multiplicity of proceedings before the Divisional Court with
statutory appeals being restricted to appeals of the merits and separate applications for judicial review being brought in respect of procedural defects. Not
only would this add to the potential delay and expense of the parties, but it
32

Relief has been refused where an alternative remedy exists, or where the applicant

is in bad faith, or where the relief requested would bring no substantial benefit to the
applicant, or where the alleged defect is trivial. See Reid, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 350 - 358.
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would add a large element of uncertainty for counsel as to which proceeding to
33
commence first and what grounds to include in the statutory right of appeal.
H.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE STATUTORY POWERS PROCEDURE RULES COMMITTEE?
This is a seven-man Committee charged with the responsibility of maintaining under continuous review the practice and procedure of (1) all tribunals
required to observe the minimum rules; (2) tribunals making statutory powers
of decision but not required to hold a hearing; (3) investigatory tribunals; and
(4) coroners inquests. The Committee has no power to make procedural rules.
This power is generally given to the tribunals themselves (above and beyond
the minimum rules), a pattern which appears throughout The Civil Rights
Statute Law Amendment Act. However, section 28 of The Statutory Powers
Procedure Act sets up a requirement of compulsory consultation:
28. No rules of procedure to govern the proceedings of a tribunal to which Part I
applies shall be made or approved except after consultation with the Committee.

In addition, section 29 gives the Committee power to require any tribunal
29 .... to report to the Committee the rules of procedure governing its proceedings
or, where there are no such rules, information as to the procedure followed by it
and to formulate and report to the Committee rules to govern its proceedings.

The combination of sections 27, 28 and 29 would appear to be an attempt
to put the Committee in the best of both worlds -

on the one hand to let the

tribunals themselves make their own rules of procedure in the first instance
since its members and not the Committee are most familiar with the nature of
its proceedings - yet on the other hand to require the tribunal to consult with
the Committee as a condition of having its rules made or approved by the
Lieutenant-Governor in Council and to allow the Committee to require a
tribunal to start making rules and to eventually report them. The idea of
providing a Committee with purely consultative functions is based in large part
on the Council of Tribunals in the United Kingdom and is clearly intended to
avoid the sort of paternalism that might otherwise develop with an all-powerful
Committee. Yet one of the principal defects in the working of the U.K. Council
of Tribunals is that it has no power to force a tribunal to get started in its rulemaking and this is the defect which section 29 above attempts to overcome.
The Rules Committee under this Act is not as powerful as that contemplated by the McRuer Commission. Mr. McRuer envisaged the Committee as
a decision-maker, having the power to make rules requiring: (1) that findings
of fact by a tribunal be based exclusively upon evidence put before it at the
33 If the tribunal has made its decision, then taking heed of the potential roadblock
posed by s. 2(5) of The Judicial Review Procedure Act (the preservation of the Court's
discretion) a party would likely opt for the statutory appeal. But he might be reluctant to
include any procedural defect in the apeal because the court might seize on it to declare
the tribunal's decision void without adjudicating on the merits. Therefore he would appeal
only on the merits. If he loses the appeal, he might then move for an application for judicial
review based on the procedural defect but then the Court might exercise its discretionary
power under s. 2(5) to refuse relief on the basis that he did not pursue the matter on the
appeal and is thereby estopped from raising it subsequently."
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hearings and on matters officially noticed and disclosed to the parties; (2) that
consultation by the tribunal during or subsequent to the hearing be limited;
(3) that members who participate in a decision be present throughout the
entire hearing; and (4) that wherever practical all evidence at a hearing be
taken down by a skilled reporter or otherwise recorded. In addition, he recommended that the Committee should have the power to specify the tribunals to
which the above rules applied, and that additional detailed rules for various
tribunals be made by the Committee in consultation with the departments
concerned.
The present Act puts the tribunals themselves in the position of decisionmaker respecting their own detailed rules, at least in the first instance. This is
emphasized by section 30 which specifies that the four requirements referred to
above are to be included as "rules of procedure" to be made voluntary by the
tribunals themselves (assuming that the power to make rules of procedure
generally is so conferred). The Committee is merely a consultant and a catalyst
in the rule-making process. The ultimate decision-maker, of course, is the
Lieutenant-Governor in Council which must approve and promulgate the
detailed rules as regulations under the statute conferring the rule-making power.
As a practical matter, it is to be expected that the Committee and the
various tribunals will work closely together in coming up with detailed rules
satisfactory to both groups. It is only in cases where the tribunal, having
commenced its rule-making activities, differs from the Committee as to the
nature and extent of detailed rules to be promulgated that the LieutenantGovernor in Council will be required to adjudicate on the matter. This is consistent with the general approach of the Act whereby statutory variations from
the minimum rules of procedure are permitted if specific legislation to this effect
is introduced and enacted. 34 While this may represent a significant drift away
from the notion of a single mandatory code of procedure for all tribunals, it is
a guarantee of flexibility which implies a faith in each tribunal's ability to come
up with procedures both consistent with the norm yet suited to its particular
processes.
In any event the effectiveness of the Committee will depend on the skill
with which it performs its reviewing, consultative and initiating functions. The
Committee draws its membership from a variety of sources.35 One would expect
that if it manages to accommodate the exigencies of each individual tribunal as
well as secure adherence to the statutory norm, it will become the de facto
34 See s.

34 of The Statutory PowersProcedureAct.
seven-man Committee is comprised as follows:
(a) The Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General (or his nominee).
(b) The Chairman of the Ontario Law Reform Commission.
(c) A Judge of the Supreme Court.
(d) A senior civil servant who is or has been a member of a Part I tribunal.
(e) A member of the Law Society of Upper Canada.
(f) A representative of the public who is not a civil servant.
(g) A professor of administrative law on the law faculty of an Ontario university.
In addition to the above, the Committee is to have one or more secretaries assigned
from members of the staff of the Department of Justice, and the Committee is
empowered to prescribe the duties of the secretary or secretaries.

35 The
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decision-maker in respect of the more detailed rules for each tribunal, and also
the government's chief advisor in respect of requests for statutory exemptions
from the minimum rules.
Finally, section 33 of the Act provides that the Committee can make rules
respecting the reporting, editing and publication of decisions of tribunals to
which Part I applies, subject to the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor in
Council. One would hope that the Committee moves quickly in this area since
the reporting of decisions will tend to promote cross-fertilization and ultimate
consistency among the tribunals and counsel appearing before them in their
approach to the minimum rules.
I.

WHAT WILL BE THE EFFECT OF THE NEW ACT ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS IN ONTARIO?
The most obvious effect will be that it will increase rather than diminish
the incidence and importance of judicial review of administrative action. At
least this will be the short-run effect. A lawyer, seeing procedural rights clearly
spelled out in a statute and no longer plagued by the judicial-administrative
distinction will be quick to seize the opportunity of attacking a tribunal's
decision on procedural grounds when his client has or is about to receive an
adverse decision on the merits or when he wishes to delay the tribunal to buy
his client time. Proceedings before tribunals therefore are likely to become more
formalized as lawyers attempt to erect their roadblocks and tribunal members
attempt to avoid them.
But in the long run a number of factors will mitigate against formalism.
First and foremost is the power of the Divisional Court under section 3 of The
JudicialReview ProcedureAct to dismiss the application where the sole ground
for relief is a defect in form or a technical irregularity and there has been no
substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice. The jurisprudential flesh which the
Divisional Court attaches to the bare bones of section 3 will be very important
in determining the nature and extent of judicial review to be permitted for
breaches of the minimum rules. Also, it must be remembered that section 2(5)
preserves the common law discretion in the Court to refuse to grant relief on
the same grounds as under old prerogative writs.
However, the greatest factor mitigating against judicial review is that over
the course of time the tribunals themselves, with the assistance of the Statutory
Powers Procedure Rules Committee, can be expected to fully incorporate the
minimum rules into their day-to-day procedures so that procedural challenges
in court will become increasingly rare. This will certainly be true for the better
known tribunals regularly making statutory powers of decision following a
hearing. It may be that the minimum rules will become the subject of judicial
review mostly with some of the more obscure tribunals which make statutory
powers of decision only rarely. This will be particularly true in the case of
various Directors and Superintendents whose primary functions are administrative in nature but who on occasion are required to make a statutory power of
decision following a hearing. In any event, the primary issue before the court on
such applications will likely be whether the minimum rules apply at all, as
opposed to whether there has been a breach of one of them.
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For those who would oppose mandatory codes of procedure for administrative tribunals, the present version of the Act may not be as bitter a pill to
swallow as would appear at first blush. While there is a common base of minimum rules, we have already seen in The Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment
Act a substantial number of variations from the norm which are clearly
permitted under section 32 of The Statutory Powers ProcedureAct as long as
they are said to "apply notwithstanding anything in this Act". We can expect to
see further variations as the government completes its comprehensive review of
all statutes conferring statutory powers of decision and as the tribunals granted
a one-year reprieve under section 36(2) come up with proposed amendments
indicating the extent to which they can or cannot live with the minimum rules.
The allowing of such variations in the minimum rules does not appear to have
been contemplated by the McRuer Commission 36 or Bill 130. 37 Happily, the
present Act moves away from the idea of a strict mandatory code and combines
the provision of a firm guideline with the flexibility permitted through express
statutory variations. The presumption is still in favour of the minimum rules
but they can be altered if justification is clearly shown. Coupled with the power
to draft its own more detailed rules, each tribunal is provided with a framework
in which it can attempt in its own way to reconcile the competing demands of
procedural justice and administrative efficiency. This approach is a decided
improvement.
36 p.

222 of the McRuer Commission Report states: "The rules should be statutory

guides to those engaged in the administrative process of government and be binding in
law."
37
In Bill 130, section 20 reads:
Notwithstanding any provision of any other Act, where there is conflict between a
provision of any other Act, regulation, bylaw or rule and a provision of this Act or
of a rule made under this Act, the provision of this Act or of a rule made under this
Act prevails.

